New Special issue
"The value-free ideal, the autonomy thesis, and cognitive diversity"
New paper by Dr. Vincenzo Politi (Postdoctoral Fellow Beatriu de Pinós at iHC) in the volume 204, of Synthese.
The paper has been published on Springer Link, in open access here.
ABSTRACT
Some debates about the role of non-epistemic values in science discuss the so-called Value-Free Ideal together with the autonomy thesis, to the point that they may be assumed to be intertwined. As I will argue in this article, the two are independent from one another, are supported by different arguments, and ought to be disentangled. I will also show that the arguments against value-freedom and supporting a value-laden conception of science, are different from the arguments against autonomy, which support democratized science. Moreover, while some of the arguments against autonomy and for democratized science may actually be consistent with value-freedom, they conflict with some philosophical views about the internal diversity of well-designed epistemic communities. This article distinguishes the Value-Free Ideal and the autonomy thesis, as well as their antitheses, and investigates their relations to some of the socio-epistemological models of the social organization of scientific research. Its aim is to make explicit some incompatibilities between different normative frameworks developed in philosophy of science.
Cite this article:
Politi, V. “The value-free ideal, the autonomy thesis, and cognitive diversity”. Synthese 204, 24 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04673-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04673-1